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Abstract
We consider software developers who can either work on an open
source project or on a closed source project. The former provides a
publicly available signal about their talent, whereas the latter provides
a signal only observed by their employer. We show that a talented em-
ployee may initially prefer a less paying job as an open source developer
to commercial closed source projects, because a publicly available sig-
nal gives him a better bargaining position when renegotiating wages
with his employer after the signal has been revealed. Also, we derive
conditions under which two effects suggested by standard intuition are
reversed: a “pooling equilibrium” (with both talented and untalented
workers doing closed source) is less likely if differences in talent are
large; a highly visible open source job leads to more effort in a career
concerns setup. The former effect is because a higher productivity of
talented workers raises not only the value but also the cost of signaling;
the latter stems from more effort and the choice of a high visibility job
being substitutes for the purpose of signaling. Results naturally apply
to other industries with high and low visibility jobs, e.g. academic
rather than commercial research, consulting rather than management.
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1 Introduction
Freely distributed Open Source Software is becoming ever more important.
For example, the notional value of investment in Open Source Software in
Europe and the US is e58 billion which is 20% of overall software invest-
ment.1 Open source software development involves software developers at
many different locations and organizations sharing a code to develop and
refine software. In recent years, open source development has generated in-
novative products such as the Apache web server which have been rapidly
diffused and now dominate their product categories. In the personal com-
puter operating system market, the open source software Linux represents
an important challenge to Microsoft’s dominant position in this market.
One of the puzzling phenomena of open source software is that individu-
als or firms participating in open source projects often do not earn any money
by working on such projects. According to Lerner and Tirole (2001), com-
mercial firms are characterized by a “rather lenient” attitude towards their
employees’ participation in open source projects. In fact, IBM is reported
to have spent more than $1 billion supporting the open source operating
system Linux and Google offers its engineers “20-percent time” so that they
are free to work on what they like to.2 As Lerner and Tirole (2005) point
out, “the decision to contribute without pay to freely available software may
seem mysterious to economists.” In our model, we explain activity in open
source projects based on the assumption of rational economic behavior by
individuals.
Participation of individuals in unpaid open source projects can be ex-
1See the study for the European Commission “Economic impact of open source software
on innovation and the competitiveness of the Information and Communication Technolo-
gies (ICT) sector in the EU” (2006), http://www.flossimpact.eu/ (accessed on August
12, 2008).
2See BusinessWeek, January 13, 2005 and
http://www.google.com/support/jobs/bin/static.py?page=about.html&about=eng
(accessed on August 12, 2008).
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plained with signaling: by participating in an open source project a software
developer signals to future employers that he is a talented programmer – an
idea first mentioned in Lerner and Tirole’s (2001) description of key research
questions in the economics of open source. As an illustration, there are many
examples of prominent open source developers later on accepting a job in
a commercial enterprise at good conditions. Linus Torvalds developed the
open source operating system Linux during his studies from 1988 to 1996
at the University of Helsinki and was hired after graduation by the Cali-
fornia based start-up Transmeta Corp., known for hiring other well known
figures from the open source community.3 The creator of the open source
programming language Python, Guido van Rossum, was hired by Google in
December 2005; Python has played an important role for software develop-
ment at Google from the beginning.4 Jim Hugunin developed in an open
source project a version of Python compatible with Sun Microsystem’s Java
platform. He was hired by Microsoft in 2004 to develop a Python version
for their competing .NET platform, a task that had been previously con-
sidered as challenging yet important to achieve in a feasibility study done
under contract to Microsoft.5 Microsoft also hired several other prominent
open source developers for various projects.6 And further, as mentioned in
Lerner and Tirole (2001), former open source developers have easier access
to venture capital: e.g. both Sun and Netscape were founded by former
open source developers. Venture capitalists are in many ways similar to the
employers in our model.
However, signaling as an explanation raises several questions. Why do
talented programmers not get paid jobs and signal their talent to their em-
3http://www.linux.org/info/linus.html (accessed on August 28, 2008).
4http://www.python.org/˜guido and http://www.python.org/about/quotes (accessed
on August 28, 2008).
5http://www.jython.org/Project/history.html, http://blogs.msdn.com/hugunin/archive/2004/08.aspx
(accessed on August 28, 2008) and Watkins, Hammond, and Abrams (2002, p.355).
6http://www.microsoft.com/opensource/heroes/heroes.mspx (accessed on August 28,
2008).
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ployer in a commercial project?7 And why do firms let their employees work
on open source projects while being paid? At first sight, this seems only to
increase the probability of the employee getting a better job offer elsewhere.
Further, supporting an open source project might reveal trade secrets to
competitors and cannibalize demand for commercial projects of the same
firm.
We argue that programmers work on unpaid (or less paid) open source
projects to solve a hold-up problem for talented employees: if the signal cre-
ated by a talented employee is only observable by his employer, the talented
employee will only get the average wage of job switchers from other employ-
ers in case he switches jobs. As we will show later, this average wage is equal
to the productivity of untalented workers in equilibrium. Therefore, he will
only get a part of his observed productivity increase when renegotiating his
wage after the signal has been revealed. A talented employee may try to
avoid this hold-up problem by first signaling his abilities to all employers in
an unpaid open source project and then getting a well paid job.
By the same logic, one can argue that a firm may be willing to let
programmers develop open source software while being employed. Firms do
this in order to credibly commit to paying higher wages after observing a
good signal and thus be able to attract talented programmers. We analyze
under which conditions an employee chooses to participate in a commercial
open source project.
Our model yields several results which are suggested by intuition. How-
ever, for two results, standard intuition can be misleading. First, it seems
less likely that talented programmers choose to do closed source development
if there is a large productivity difference between talented and untalented
programmers. Second, one would believe that working in a highly visible
7One could argue that in a commercial firm, they would first get “boring” projects
with little signaling value; an open source project would allow them to signal immediately.
However, one would need an explanation why a commercial firm would not let its employees
first do jobs with a high signal first.
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open source job leads to a higher effort level in a career concerns setup where
future employers cannot distinguish whether success is due to effort or talent.
Interestingly, a formalization of the model shows that there are conditions
under which these results are reversed. While we derive these conditions
explicitly in the main text, we can already state the basic intuitions here.
For the first result, a higher productivity of talented programmers has the
following two countervailing effects. It increases the value of signaling. But
it also increases the opportunity costs of signaling, since initially working
on an open source project means giving up the average productivity wage
in the first period. The latter effect can dominate. The second result stems
from the fact that signaling one’s ability through choosing open source de-
velopment is in a sense a substitute for effort in a career concerns setup. If
you are willing to make the success or failure of your project public ex ante,
then people will attribute say a possible failure of your project less to your
abilities and more to bad luck ex post.
Even though our main example is open source software development, our
results carry over to any industry with highly visible and less visible jobs,
in particular to research carried out both in academia and in the private
industry. Examples include research in the pharmaceutical and the finan-
cial industry, where there is high labor mobility between academia and the
private industry. Related to this is also the observation that many business
graduates start their career at highly visible jobs with consulting firms and
hence signal their abilities not just to their employers but to the clients
of their consulting firms as well. They can benefit from this public signal
at a later stage of their career when they leave consulting. There are sev-
eral further examples discussed in the empirical literature. Loveman and
O’Connell (1996) report that software developers often get job offers from
clients after having worked with them on site. According to Autor (2001),
“between 11 and 18 percent of Temporary Help Service workers placed on
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assignment in a calendar month are directly hired by clients”. Chevalier
and Ellison (1999) consider mutual fund managers as public figures whose
performance is readily observable and find that a mutual fund manager’s
probability of retaining or improving his current position is increasing in his
performance, measured by the risk-adjusted return he achieves. Along the
same lines, Massa, Reuter, and Zitzewitz (2006) find that mutual funds ad-
ministered by managers whose name is disclosed earn slightly higher returns
than anonymously managed funds. Even though the concept that some jobs
are more visible than others is wide spread, we use open versus closed source
as our motivating example because there is a clear technological and legal
commitment8 to disclose workers’ contributions in open source projects and
hence provide a publicly observable signal.
Besides shedding light on the effects of disclosure policies, the purpose of
this paper is to describe one effect that makes open source development more
attractive. We do not claim that this is the only effect that explains partici-
pation in open source development. There are of course other effects as well.
For instance developers may be motivated by altruism, the desire of peer
recognition, and by enjoying developing software. Firms may participate in
open source projects to improve their corporate image, to commit to cooper-
ation with other firms in an incomplete contracts setup (Niedermayer 2007),
and to increase sales of a commercial product complementary to the open
source software.
Note also that we make the simplifying assumption that visibility can
only consist of either of two extremes: potential outside employers observe
no signal at all or they observe a signal as good as the employer. In reality,
there are intermediate levels of disclosure: closed source projects can list the
8In public open source software repositories such as Sourceforge.net, log files of changes
made by individual contributors are kept and accessible by the public. On the le-
gal side, the GNU General Public License obliges firms incorporating open source soft-
ware in one of their products to disclose the source code they add to this product (see
http://www.gnu.org).
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names of developers,9 consulting may send a weaker signal about workers’
abilities to their clients than to their employers. Results should carry over
to an analysis with intermediate levels of disclosure.
Related Literature. This paper relates to the literature on open source
software such as Lerner and Tirole (2001) and Johnson (1999). Lerner and
Tirole (2001) mention signaling as a possible reason for involvement in an
open source project; Spiegel (2005), Lee, Moisa, and Weiss (2003), and
Leppa¨ma¨ki and Mustonen (2003) provide a formalization of this idea. We
differ from these contributions to the literature by modeling the hold-up
problem of the talented programmer and the employer explicitly, by allowing
employers to distinguish between talented and untalented programmers after
completion of a closed source project, and by assuming that firms can also
do open source development.
Further, our analysis is related to the information disclosure literature.
Mukherjee (2008a), Mukherjee (2008b), and Bar-Isaac, Jewitt, and Leaver
(2007) also consider jobs with different visibility levels. We differ by assum-
ing that the worker knows his ability already before he chooses his first job.
This turns out to have a major impact on the outcome, since a worker’s
choice of a high versus a low visibility job becomes a signal about his ability.
This also leads to our finding that a worker may exercise less effort in a high
visibility job.
Our analysis of the case where the probability of success depends on the
effort level of the programmer relates to the economics of career concerns
as first described in the seminal paper by Holmstrom (1999, original version
appeared in 1982), who analyzes whether a manager’s concern for a future
career gives him the incentive to exercise effort (see also Dewatripont, Jewitt,
9If a developer’s name is listed in the credits of the software, it is hard to tell exactly
how much he contributed to its success (or failure). Even if names are grouped in cate-
gories such as lead developers and other developers, it is still more difficult to distinguish
individual contributions than in open source projects.
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and Tirole (1999a) and Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999b)). We depart
from the career concerns literature by also considering low visibility (closed
source) jobs which only create a private signal about an employee’s success
besides the high visibility jobs creating a public signal, which are already
present in Holmstrom (1999). To keep the analysis analytically tractable,
we follow most of the literature related to ours by considering a two period
model rather than Holmstrom’s infinite horizon.
As in Waldman (1984), Greenwald (1986), Acemoglu and Pischke (1998),
and Li (2007) the current employer is better informed than other employers.
We depart from these articles in two main points. First, besides low visibility
jobs, there are also high visibility jobs creating a public signal about the
worker’s ability. Second, a worker knows his ability before choosing a job.
The second point is also considered in Hermalin (2002), but not the first.
In a wider sense, the paper also relates to the literature on “open sci-
ence”, i.e. the disclosure of research findings, starting with Dasgupta and
David (1994) (see also Mukherjee and Stern (2007) and the references therein).
Such a disclosure is similar in spirit to open source and also creates a public
signal about a researcher’s abilities – an effect that has not been modeled
in the open science literature to the best of our knowledge.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 starts with
a setting where the success of a project is a perfect signal of an employee’s
abilities and considers open source developers being paid as employees of
firms. Results naturally carry over to unpaid open source development.
Section 3 extends the analysis to imperfect signals about abilities. Section 4
introduces an unobservable effort level of a developer that influences the
probability of success of the project. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Perfect Signal
There are two periods. In the first period workers can decide whether to
do closed source or open source development. In the second period they
can only do closed source development. There are two types of workers:
talented and untalented. Let the proportion of talented workers be λ, that of
untalented 1−λ. Workers know their own types, but firms do not. A talented
programmer working on a closed source project succeeds with probability
p1, an untalented one with probability p0. For the sake of simplicity, we
first assume p1 = 1 and p0 = 0, i.e. success depends deterministically on
talent and success or failure is a perfect signal about an employee’s abilities.
The success of a closed source project is only observed by the employer.
Qualitative results should carry over for the case where other employers
do observe a signal, but a weaker one. A successful closed source project
generates revenues πs, an unsuccessful one πf , with πs > πf . A talented
employee working in an open source project succeeds with probability q1, an
untalented one with probability q0. Again, assume for simplicity that the
signal is perfect, i.e. q1 = 1, q0 = 0. The profits generated by an open source
project are given by κs and κf in case of success and failure, with κs ≥ κf .
Note that the situation where open source development is voluntary unpaid
work is a special case of our analysis, with profits κs = κf = 0 and hence
zero equilibrium wages, as we will show later. In this case it does not matter
whether an employee works for a firm or independently.
After the first period workers get new wage offers from their employers
and can switch jobs. Assume that firms are perfectly competitive and pay
wages equal to expected profits. Wages in the first period (before the signal)
are
w1 = λ˜Πt + (1− λ˜)Πu, (2.1)
where Πt (Πu) stands for overall expected profits generated by hiring a
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talented (untalented) worker and λ˜ stands for the proportion of talented
workers among applicants for a certain type of job (open or closed source),
i.e. λ˜ = 0 if only untalented, λ˜ = 1 if only talented, and λ˜ = λ if both types
of workers apply for the job in equilibrium.
Πt = πs + δ(1 − νs)(πs − ws), (2.2)
Πu = πf + δ(1− νf )(πf − wf ), (2.3)
where νs (νf ) is the probability that a successful (unsuccessful) employee
wishes to switch jobs at stage 2 (which will be determined in equilibrium)
and ws, wf are the wages offered to employees after the signal has been
observed, and δ is the “discount rate” (as employment in the second stage
may be for a longer time than in the first period, δ may be larger than 1).
2.1 Closed Source Development
In order to introduce our model, we assume in a first step that there is only
closed source software. So at stage 2 only the employer observes the signal.
We denote the wage that people who did closed source and switch jobs get
as w¯.
As firms face perfect competition for non-locked-in employees, wages of
job switchers are equal to expected productivity:
w¯ =
νsλπs + νf (1− λ)πf
νsλ+ νf (1− λ) ,
the denominator representing the proportion of job switchers in the total
population, i.e. the unconditional probability to switch.
The employer of a successful employee knows that his productivity will
be πs in the next period. He does not face perfect competition, because
other employers cannot observe whether the employee was successful or not,
and will hence only pay w¯. Hence, the surplus generated by continuing the
employment is πs − w¯. We assume that this surplus is split according to
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the Nash bargaining solution: the employer gets (1 − α), the employee α
of (πs − w¯), where 0 < α ≤ 1.10 Note that both parties – employer and
employee – have full information in this bargaining process; the third party
in the bargaining process – the potential employer providing the outside
option – is not participating strategically, he merely stands ready to pay the
market equilibrium wage in case negotiations break down. Therefore, the
Nash bargaining solution is an appropriate solution concept in our setup.
A firm observing a bad signal will offer its untalented employees wf = πf :
it cannot offer less, since we assume that firms are competitive, neither
more, since it would make losses. Wages paid to talented employees are
ws = w¯ + α(πs − w¯) = απs + (1− α)w¯.
In order to determine the equilibrium, we have to distinguish two cases,
depending on the firm’s beliefs about what the employees will do: either only
the untalented employees switch jobs or both types of employees switch.11
First, we will show that it is a rational expectations equilibrium that firms
believe that only untalented workers switch jobs in period 2, i.e. there is
adverse selection. Then we will show that this equilibrium is unique. If
firms believe that only untalented workers switch jobs, switching jobs is
interpreted as a signal for being untalented and job switchers are paid the
low wage in period 2, i.e. w = wf = πf . Wages paid to talented employees
are then ws = απs + (1 − α)πf , which is higher than πf . Hence, talented
workers do not want to switch jobs and the expectations of the firms are
confirmed. Talented workers do not switch jobs because only their employer
knows that they are talented. This allows the talented employees to obtain
a higher wage according to the Nash bargaining solution.
This equilibrium is unique because it is not an equilibrium that both
10It is shown in Proposition 3 in Appendix A.1 that no equilibrium in pure strategies
exists if we assume that the employer has all the bargaining power (α = 0).
11We do not have to consider the case where firms believe that only the talented em-
ployees switch jobs in period 2. If the talented workers find it optimal to switch, the
untalented will want to switch too.
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talented and untalented workers want to switch jobs in period 2. The reason
is that whatever the wage w¯ for job switchers is, the employer of a talented
employee can always offer a wage between w¯ and πs to the employee and
retain him. The wage for job switchers clearly has to be less than πs, because
a new employer has to take into account the possibility of hiring untalented
workers.
2.2 Open Source Development
Let us now introduce the possibility of participating in an open source
project and sending a public signal about one’s talent.
We consider a setting where employees are paid by a firm for doing open
source development during work hours. If the employee works on an open
source project while being paid, he can work on a project aligned with the
interests of the firm. The success of the project will thus typically generate
profits for the firm. These profits can e.g. come from money paid by a
client for the development of a specific piece of software adjusted for the
client’s needs or from complementary consulting services offered by the firm.
Furthermore, the firm may immediately benefit from the experience that its
employees have gained by participating in the open source project. The
profits generated by the open source project, κs and κf (in case of success
or failure, with κs > κf ) can be lower or higher than their counterparts
πs and πf for the commercial project.
12 As noted before, our analysis also
holds for open source projects that do not generate profits, i.e. κs = κf = 0.
Participating in an open source project allows the employee to send a
public signal about his talent. We assume that the signal is perfect, i.e.
q1 = 1, q0 = 0. Having sent out a perfect signal, the second stage wage of
12We will not specify this further, but open source software is usually given away for
free and also allows competitors to imitate more easily. This would lead to lower open
source profits. But there are also countervailing effects, e.g. the open source community
contributing to the development of the software and thus leading to lower costs and higher
profits.
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first stage open source developers will equal actual productivity, i.e. ws = πs,
wf = πf , since firms are competitive.
At stage 1, a firm allows its employees to develop open source software
while being employed. For the sake of simplicity, we consider the case where
workers can either do only open source development or only closed source
development in the first period. Open source development yields profits
κs or κf , closed source development yields profits πs or πf . The profit
difference between a successful and an unsuccessful closed source project
will be denoted by ∆π := πs − πf .
We have to distinguish several cases, depending on the beliefs of the firms
about what the employees will do. Note that also untalented workers may
be interested in doing open source development. If an untalented worker
participates in an open source project, this will reveal his lack of talent to
all firms. However, depending on relative profits of closed source and open
source projects, the first period wage may be high enough to compensate
untalented workers for this effect.
In the following we will look at candidates for rational expectations equi-
libria. We will take the beliefs of firms about the behavior of workers as given
and look whether workers’ equilibrium behavior fulfills the expectations. In
general, multiple equilibria can arise. The following Proposition shows when
an equilibrium is possible.
Proposition 1. (i) Open-closed case: The case where talented workers
do open source development and untalented workers do closed source
development can be sustained as an equilibrium if
∆π >
πf − κs
δ(1 − α) =: ∆π, and πf > κs.
(ii) Closed-open case: The case where talented workers do closed and un-
talented workers do open source development cannot be sustained as
an equilibrium.
2 PERFECT SIGNAL 14
(iii) Open-open case: The case where both the talented workers and the
untalented workers do open source development can be sustained as an
equilibrium if
λκs + (1− λ)κf > πf .
(iv) Closed-closed case: The case where both the talented workers and the
untalented workers do closed source development can be sustained as
an equilibrium if
∆π <
κf − πf
β
=: ∆πcc if β < 0
and
∆π >
κf − πf
β
=: ∆πcc if β > 0
with β := λ− (1− λ)δ(1 − α).
Before proceeding to the proof of the Proposition, we describe the intu-
ition behind these results.
Open-closed case: The benefits of open source development are high
enough and the talented workers will choose to develop open source soft-
ware in period 1 if the productivity difference ∆π is sufficiently high, the
discount rate δ is sufficiently high, and the employees bargaining position is
sufficiently low.
Closed-open case: If open source development is more attractive to un-
talented workers than closed source development, then open source devel-
opment also has to be more attractive to talented workers. This is the case
because talented workers gain the same as untalented workers in the first pe-
riod if they do open source development (since the firms cannot distinguish
between worker types) and at least as much in the second period. Therefore,
this cannot be an equilibrium.
Open-open case: If average productivity in open source development in
period 1 is higher than the productivity of the untalented worker in a closed
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source project, it is an equilibrium that both types of workers will choose to
do open source development in the first period.
Closed-closed case: The condition for this case can be interpreted as
follows. If β < 0, we have the intuitive result that a high value of πs
compared to πf makes it more difficult to sustain the equilibrium where
both types of workers do closed source development, since signaling is more
valuable. However, for β > 0, the intuition is reversed: closed-closed is
an equilibrium if the productivity difference is sufficiently large (or: πs is
sufficiently large)! This unexpected and at first sight counterintuitive result
can be explained the following way. There are two countervailing effects
of a larger πs: (1) it makes open source development more attractive since
an open source developer earns relatively more in the second period, but
(2) also makes closed source development more attractive since first period
closed source wages are a sum of the average of πs and πf and expected
profits from “exploiting” talented workers in the second period. Effect (2)
is stronger if β is positive. This can be seen e.g. if β is positive because
δ is close to 0 (second period unimportant) and hence effect (1) vanishes.
Similarly for λ close to 1 (most people are talented, so no need to prove it)
and α close to 1 (second period hold-up problem is unimportant).
Proof. (i) Open-closed case: We will use the following notation to derive
conditions for the rational expectations equilibria. Vt and Vu denote the net
present value of a talented and an untalented worker, respectively. Super-
script o (c) denotes that firms expect a worker to do open (closed) source
development in period 1. Subscript o (c) indicates that the worker has cho-
sen to do open (closed) source development. Thus, expectations are fulfilled
if superscript and subscript coincide.
A talented employee working on a closed source project in the first period
earns the net present value V otc = πf +δ[απs+(1−α)πf ]. If he works in open
source, he earns V oto = κs + δπs, since the competitive firms pay wages equal
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to (expected) productivity. An untalented worker earns V cuc = πf + δπf if
he chooses closed source in the first period. If he chooses open source, he
earns V cuo = κs + δπf , since firms initially believe him to be talented, but
his lack of talent is revealed after the first period.
Open-closed is a rational expectations equilibrium if no one has an incen-
tive to deviate from expectations, i.e. V oto > V
o
tc and V
c
uc > V
c
uo. Substituting
in the V s and rearranging yields
∆π >
πf − κs
δ(1 − α)
def
= ∆π and πf > κs.
(ii) Closed-open case: Assume to the contrary that closed-open is an
equilibrium. A talented employee doing closed source earns V ctc = πs + δπs.
Deviation from equilibrium strategy yields V cto = κf+δπs, since in the second
period firms notice that the worker is talented contrary to their first period
beliefs. An untalented worker earns V ouo = κf +δπf if he chooses open source
in the first period. If he chooses closed source, he earns V ouc = πs+δπs, since
firms believe that job switchers in the second period are talented.
Closed-open is a rational expectations equilibrium if V ctc > V
c
to and V
o
uo >
V ouc, which is equivalent to κf−δ∆π > πs > κf and therefore a contradiction.
(iii) Open-open case: We choose the firms’ beliefs off the equilibrium
path such that the equilibrium is most easily supported: firms believe in
the first period that a worker who chooses to do closed source is untalented.
Hence, deviation from the equilibrium strategy by a talented worker yields
V otc = πf + δ[απs + (1 − α)πf ]. If he works in open source, he earns V oto =
w˜1 + δπs, where w˜1 is similar to the first-period wage w1 in (2.1), (2.2), and
(2.3), but now we have w˜1 = λΠ˜t + (1− λ)Π˜u, where
Π˜t = κs + δ(1 − νs)(πs − ws) = κs,
Π˜u = κf + δ(1 − νf )(πf −wf ) = κf ,
since workers will be paid their productivity after their ability is publicly
observed after the first period.
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Deviation from the equilibrium strategy by an untalented worker yields
V ouc = (1 + δ)πf . An untalented worker earns V
o
uo = w˜1 + δπf if he chooses
open source in the first period.
Open-open is a rational expectations equilibrium if V oto > V
o
tc and V
o
uo >
V ouc. If the second inequality is true, then the first inequality is also true,
since πs > απs + (1 − α)πf . Thus, we only need the second inequality as
equilibrium condition, which reduces to πf < w˜1 = λκs + (1− λ)κf .
(iv) Closed-closed case: Again, we assume that if the workers deviate
from firms’ beliefs, they will be considered to be untalented. In this setting,
the net present values are V ctc = w1 + δ[απs + (1 − α)πf ], V cto = κf + δπs,
V cuc = w1 + δπf , and V
c
uo = κf + δπf , where w1 is given by the results from
section 2.1:
w1 = λ[πs + δ(πs − απs − (1− α)πf )] + (1− λ)πf
Closed-closed is a rational expectations equilibrium if V ctc > V
c
to and
V cuc > V
c
uo. If the first inequality is true, then the second inequality is also
true, since απs + (1−α)πf < πs. Hence we only need the first inequality as
the equilibrium condition, which reduces to
∆π[λ− (1− λ)δ(1 − α)] > κf − πf ,
after substituting in w1 and rearranging. Note that the signs of both the
expression in the brackets and the right hand side are ambiguous. Hence,
writing the equilibrium condition in terms of the productivity difference ∆π
gives
∆π <
κf − πf
β
=: ∆πcc if β < 0
and
∆π >
κf − πf
β
=: ∆πcc if β > 0
with β = λ− (1− λ)δ(1 − α).
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Discussion. For an interpretation of our model we can consider different
constellations of the parameter values of πs, πf , κs, and κf .
For the “standard” case πs > πf ≥ κs ≥ κf it is possible to have an
equilibrium where talented workers participate in open source projects to
signal their talent and untalented workers do closed source development,
even though open source development is wasteful in this setup. If open
source projects create only small positive externalities (which are not mod-
eled here), then the existence of open source projects would decrease social
welfare. Of course, for externalities being large enough, it is welfare enhanc-
ing.
Another, less obvious case is πs > κs > κf > πf . If open source projects
(or academic jobs) did not create positive externalities, it would be socially
efficient that talented workers choose to work in the closed source develop-
ment (private sector) and that only the untalented workers choose an open
source or academic job. However, it is a possible equilibrium that both the
talented and the untalented workers will choose a highly visible job such as
e.g. open source developer (or teaching assistant at a university) first as
described in the open-open case above. Talented workers choose the high
visibility job to publicly signal their ability, untalented workers get a higher
wage in the first period by doing open source development and get the low
wage in the second period anyway.13 In such a situation, it may be socially
efficient to forbid open source/academic jobs if the difference between πs
and κs is large enough.
14 This is of course only a theoretical argument,
we do not believe that such a policy would be meaningful in practice for
a variety of reasons. Most importantly, open source development and aca-
demic research provide a public good, an effect that is stronger than the
13Note that our assumption that open source development is not possible in the second
period does not matter for most setups. Here, however, it does. The model could be easily
extended to allow for second-period open source development.
14The policy implication, that banning signaling may be socially efficient, resembles
Spence (1973). However, here both talented and untalented workers engage in signaling
by participating in an open source project.
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inefficiencies described above.
A further case is πs > κs > πf > κf . Here again, it is possible that both
types of workers do open source development, even though none of them
would in a world without informational asymmetries.
It is to be noted that if the provision of open source software is an
important public good problem, then informational asymmetries and the
hold-up problem are actually welfare enhancing, since they give incentives
to the creation of a public good.
As a special case of the “standard” case, we can consider a setting where
open source projects are non-commercial, i.e. open source developers do not
earn any money. In our model, this means that κs = κf = 0. In a setting
with non-commercial open source development and under the plausible as-
sumption that πf > 0 Proposition 1 implies that we can exclude the case
where both types of workers do open source development.15 This is intuitive,
because an untalented worker will clearly not want to signal his ability since
he can get a wage at stage 1 (contrary to unpaid open source development)
and get at least πf at stage 2 if his lack of talent is not revealed.
3 Imperfect Signal
In this section, we consider imperfect signals in a setting where open source
projects are non-commercial, i.e. open source developers do not earn any
money (which means κs = κf = 0 in the notation used above). In the pre-
vious sections, we have assumed for simplicity that the signals are perfect.
Both in the closed source project and in the open source project, a talented
employee succeeded for sure. On the other hand, an untalented employee
always failed to develop a successful project. Now, a talented programmer
working on a closed source project succeeds with probability p1, an un-
15Negative values of pif would mean that an untalented worker does some harm to the
firm. Such a worker would earn a negative wage in period 2 and thus would decide not to
work.
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talented one with probability p0, with 0 < p0 < p1 < 1. In case of the
open source project, a talented employee succeeds with probability q1, an
untalented one with probability q0, with 0 < q0 < q1 < 1.
In this setting, firms cannot observe that a certain project was success-
ful and deduce that the employee in charge of this project is talented. For
instance, a talented employee may have bad luck and fail to develop a suc-
cessful project. Conversely, an untalented worker may be lucky and develop
a successful project. However, firms condition their expectations about the
productivity of a certain worker on their observations. In period 1, firms
don’t have any observations indicating the talent of a worker. We intro-
duce the following notation: E[π|T ] denotes the expected productivity of a
talented worker (T) working on a closed source project. We have
E[π|T ] = p1πs + (1− p1)πf .
Similarly, the expected productivity of an untalented worker (U) working
on a closed source project is given by
E[π|U ] = p0πs + (1− p0)πf .
In period 2, firms observe an imperfect signal (namely whether the
project was successful or not) both in case of the open source project and in
case of the closed source project. Hence, they will form their expectations
about the productivity of a certain worker conditional on the signal observed
in the previous period. We denote these expectations by E(π|S ∩ C) and
E(π|F ∩C) for the closed source project. In case of the open source project,
the expectations are given by E(π|S ∩O) and E(π|F ∩O).
For the calculations below, we introduce the following notation. The
probability of a talented worker (T) to succeed in a commercial project is
denoted by P (S|T ∩ C) = p1. The probability of an untalented worker (U)
to succeed in a commercial project is denoted by P (S|U ∩ C) = p0. In case
of the open source project we have P (S|T ∩O) = q1 and P (S|U ∩O) = q0.
3 IMPERFECT SIGNAL 21
The untalented worker can either strictly prefer closed source develop-
ment, strictly prefer open source development, or be indifferent and hence
play a mixed strategy: open source with probability γ, closed source with
probability 1 − γ. The same applies for the talented worker, the proba-
bility to develop open source software being denoted as ǫ. Both γ and ǫ
are endogenously determined by the parameters of the model. There are 9
combinations of these possibilities as depicted in Fig. 1.
The probability of a worker being successful (S) and doing open source
development is
P (S ∩O) = P (S|T ∩O)P (O|T )P (T ) + P (S|U ∩O)P (O|U)P (U)
where P (S|T ∩ O) = q1 is the probability that a talented worker doing
open source is successful, P (O|T ) = ǫ the probability that a talented worker
does open source, and P (T ) = λ the probability that a worker is talented.
By Bayes’ rule, a firm observing that a worker does open source and was
successful attributes the following probability to the worker being talented:
P (T |S ∩O) = P (S|T ∩O)P (O|T )P (T )
P (S ∩O) =
q1ǫλ
q1ǫλ+ q0γ(1− λ) .
Analogously, the probability of a worker being untalented is
P (U |S ∩O) = q0γ(1− λ)
q1ǫλ+ q0γ(1− λ) .
The expected productivity of a worker who succeeded in an open source
project in period 1 is then given by
E(π|S ∩O) = P (T |S ∩O)E[π|T ] + P (U |S ∩O)E[π|U ].
The probability of a worker failing to develop a successful project (F) and
doing open source development is
P (F ∩O) = (1− q1)ǫλ+ (1− q0)γ(1 − λ).
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Using the same calculations as above, we get
P (T |F ∩O) = (1− q1)ǫλ
(1− q1)ǫλ+ (1− q0)γ(1− λ) .
and
P (U |F ∩O) = (1− q0)γ(1− λ)
(1− q1)ǫλ+ (1− q0)γ(1− λ) .
The expected productivity of a worker who failed in period 1 is given by
E(π|F ∩O) = P (T |F ∩O)E[π|T ] + P (U |F ∩O)E[π|U ]
For the case of closed source development the expressions P (T |S ∩ C),
P (U |S ∩C), P (T |F ∩C), and P (U |F ∩C) are calculated by the same logic,
but with p instead of q, (1− ǫ) instead of ǫ and (1− γ) instead of γ.
The expressions above will be used when firms do Bayesian updating
after they see whether a worker had success or not. Since the signal does not
perfectly reveal a worker’s type, there are now more possibilities on firms’ off-
equilibrium beliefs than in the previous setting with perfect signals. In the
previous section, if a talented worker chose to do open source development,
firms could not rationally believe that he is untalented, since it would have
been impossible for him to be successful.
In order to determine the equilibria, we distinguish several cases which
are represented in Figure 1. γ denotes the fraction of the untalented work-
ers who decide to do open source development in period 1. Similarly, ǫ
denotes the fraction of the talented workers who decide to do open source
development in period 1. For instance, in point 1 both the talented and the
untalented workers do closed source development in period 1. In point 8,
all the talented workers and a fraction γ of the untalented workers do open
source development in period 1.
We find that the cases 1, 5, 8, and 9 can be an equilibrium and that
the remaining cases can be excluded, because they cannot be sustained as
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Figure 1: The equilibrium candidates. γ is the probability that the untal-
ented worker develops open source software, ǫ is the corresponding proba-
bility for the talented worker. Edges and corners represent cases where a
worker strictly prefers open (or closed) source. At points between corners
or edges, a worker is indifferent between open source and closed source, and
hence plays a mixed strategy. Cases which cannot be sustained as rational
expectations equilibria are crossed out.
rational expectations equilibria. These results are illustrated in Fig. 1 and
stated in Prop. 2.
Proposition 2. (i) Cases 1, 5, 8, and 9 can be an equilibrium.
(ii) Cases 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 cannot be sustained as rational expectations
equilibria.
Next, we discuss case 8, where all talented and a fraction of the un-
talented workers choose to do open source development. The proof of the
results for the remaining cases is banned to the appendix.
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Case 8: All talented and fraction of untalented workers do open
source. In case 8 all the talented workers (ǫ = 1) and a fraction 0 < γ < 1
of the untalented workers do open source development in period 1.
A talented worker who chooses to work on a closed source project from
the beginning (contrary to the firms’ expectations) earns the net present
value E[V otc] = (1 + δ)E[π|U ].
If the talented worker chooses to participate in an open source project
in period 1, he will earn a wage equal to his expected productivity after the
signal has been revealed:
E[V oto] = δ(q1E[π|S ∩O] + (1− q1)E[π|F ∩O])
The payoffs of the untalented workers are E[Vuc] = (1 + δ)E[π|U ]. if
they do closed source development and
E[Vuo] = δ(q0E[π|S ∩O] + (1− q0)E[π|F ∩O])
if they do open source development in period 1.
Case 8 is an equilibrium if the talented worker prefers to do open source
E[V oto] > E[V
o
tc]
and the untalented worker is indifferent
E[Vuo] = E[Vuc].
Inserting the different expressions for E[V oto] and E[V
o
tc] and using ǫ = 1
(since we are in case 8) yields
δ
(
q1
{
q1λE[π|T ] + q0γ(1− λ)E[π|U ]
q1λ+ q0γ(1− λ)
}
+(1− q1)
{
(1− q1)λE[π|T ] + (1− q0)γ(1 − λ)E[π|U ]
(1− q1)λ+ (1− q0)γ(1 − λ)
})
> (1 + δ)E[π|U ]
With p0 = q0 → 0 this condition simplifies to
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δ (q1(p1πs + (1− p1)πf )
+(1− q1)
{
(1− q1)λ(p1πs + (1− p1)πf ) + γ(1− λ)πf
(1 − q1)λ+ γ(1− λ)
})
> (1 + δ)πf
The fraction γ of the untalented workers who do open source develop-
ment in period 1 can be determined by inserting the expressions for E[Vuo]
and E[Vuc] into the equation above. Using ǫ = 1, this yields
(1 + δ)E[π|U ] =
δ
(
q0
{
q1λE[π|T ] + q0γ(1− λ)E[π|U ]
q1λ+ q0γ(1− λ)
}
+(1− q0)
{
(1− q1)λE[π|T ] + (1− q0)γ(1− λ)E[π|U ]
(1− q1)λ+ (1− q0)γ(1 − λ)
})
.
With p0 = q0 → 0 this condition simplifies to
(1 + δ)πf = δ
(
(1− q1)λ(p1πs + (1− p1)πf ) + γ(1− λ)πf
(1− q1)λ+ γ(1− λ)
)
.
It can be shown that the inequality condition is always fulfilled if the
equality condition is fulfilled (the inequality reduces to πs > πf , which is true
by assumption). This reflects the following intuition: if untalented workers
are indifferent between open source and closed source, then talented workers
must prefer open source development.16
Solving the equation above for γ yields
γ =
λ
1− λ
[δp1(πs − πf )− πf ]
πf
(1− q1),
a result that will be helpful in the next section.
16Note that this result stems from p0 = q0 → 0. Without this simplifying assumption,
the relation is not clear, as shown for case 5 in Prop. 2.
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4 Effort
The analysis can be extended to a career concerns setup (see e.g. Holmstrom
(1999)) where the probability of success depends on the effort level of the
programmer. In the first period a worker will exercise effort to increase the
probability of success and hence appear more likely to be talented. In the
second period he does not exercise effort.
Coexistence of Open Source and Closed Source Development (Case
8). Assume that a talented programmer’s probability of success depends
on his effort e and is equal for the open source and the closed source case
p(e) = q(e). Further p′ > 0, p′(0) = ∞, p′(∞) = 0, and p′′ < 0. For
the untalented worker we assume the probability of success to be positive,
so that the previous section’s analysis carries over, but to converge to zero
p0 = q0 → 0 in order to simplify the analysis. We will first focus on case 8 of
the previous section, i.e. all talented workers develop open source software
and untalented workers randomize between open source and closed source
with probability γ.
The probability γ of untalented workers doing open source software de-
velopment can be derived from the equation E[Vuo] = E[Vuc] of the previous
section by replacing p1 with the equilibrium probability of success p(e
∗) of
talented workers and p0 with 0 and solving for γ:
γ =
λ
1− λ
[δp(0)(πs − πf )− πf ]
πf
(1− p(e∗)). (4.1)
In the second period a talented worker has probability of success p(0)
since he does not exercise effort. The talented worker’s utility is
E[V oto]− e = δ (p(e)E[π|S ∩O] + (1− p(e))E[π|F ∩O]) ,
Taking the derivative with respect to e, substituting in the E[π|...]s, and
rearranging yields the first order condition
p′(e∗)[δp(0)(πs − πf )− πf ] = 1, (4.2)
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which is sufficient since our assumptions on p ensure that the second order
condition is satisfied.
Using the concavity of p we get to the following conclusions by invoking
the implicit function theorem. The equilibrium effort level e∗ is increasing
with the discount factor δ, the difference of profits between successful and
unsuccessful projects ∆π = πs− πf , and the probability of success p(0) of a
talented worker who does not exercise effort in the second period. Effort is
decreasing in the profit of an unsuccessful project πf .
Only Closed Source Development (Case 1). We can compare this
to case 1 where both types of workers develop closed source projects. The
comparison can be understood as either a situation where there are multiple
equilibria, including cases 1 and 8, or where open source development is not
possible for exogenous (e.g. technological or legal) reasons.
A talented worker maximizes his utility
E[V ctc]−e = w1+δ [p(e)(αE[π|S ∩ C] + (1− α)E[π|F ∩ C]) + (1− p(e))E[π|F ∩ C]]−e,
by choosing effort level e. This leads to the first order condition
δαp′(e∗) {E[π|S ∩C]− E[π|F ∩C]} = 1.
Substituting for the expected probabilities the results of the previous section
and using the assumption γ = ǫ = 0 (since we are in case 1) and p0 → 0, we
get
p′(e∗)α
1− λ
1 − λp(e∗) [δp(0)(πs − πf )] = 1. (4.3)
Again, by concavity of p and the implicit function theorem we get to the
following conclusions.17 Effort level is increasing in the employee’s bargain-
17The fact that firms’ expectations about equilibrium effort level enter the developers’
effort choice problem through the term 1− λp(e∗) strengthens the effects of the different
parameters on effort, since higher expectations of e∗ lead to a higher chosen effort and vice
versa. This could lead to multiple equilibria: if firms expect high effort, employees have
to exert high effort, otherwise they exert low effort. We assume that there is a unique
equilibrium effort level, e.g. because p is sufficiently concave: p′′(e) < −λp′(e)/[α(1 −
λ)δp(0)(pis − pif )] for all e.
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ing power α, the discount factor δ, the productivity difference ∆π, and the
probability of success p(0) of a talented worker not exercising effort. It is
decreasing with the proportion of talented workers λ.
Comparison. Our results allow us to compare effort levels when talented
workers do open source development (case 8, Eq. (4.2)) and when they do
closed source development (case 1, Eq. (4.3)). Rather than finding thresh-
olds for parameters, we show that certain statements hold for certain ex-
treme values of parameters. The exact thresholds depend on the specific
functional form of p. Clearly, for α → 1, λ → 0, πf → 0,18 effort levels are
the same for both cases. For α≪ 1, λ→ 0, πf → 0, more effort is exercised
if open source development coexists with closed source development. This
seems rather intuitive: higher visibility of a project leads to more effort (see
Lerner and Tirole (2002)). However, contrary to standard economic intu-
ition, the opposite may hold as well. For α→ 1, λ→ 0, πf ≫ 0, more effort
is exercised if talented workers do closed source development! The reason
is that for large values of πf , open source is less attractive for untalented
workers and hence only a small proportion γ of them choose to develop open
source software (Eq. (4.1)). Therefore, a talented programmer already sends
a strong signal about his talent by choosing open source development and
does not need to exercise that much effort to prove his ability in an open
source project. This effect may be stronger than the countervailing effect of
having a worse bargaining position in a closed source project if α is large
enough. Note that with p0 → 0 the two inequality conditions for equilibrium
1 and the inequality condition for equilibrium 8 are always ensured.19 One
18Convergence of parameters has to be such that the proportion of untalented workers
γ remains in the permissible range (0, 1).
19In case 8, if untalented workers are indifferent between open source and closed source,
then talented workers must prefer open source development. In case 1, if firms believe
that the off-equilibrium behavior of doing open source means being untalented, then it
does not pay off to deviate. Note that firms will not update their beliefs after an open
source developer was successful, since an untalented programmer can be unsuccessful with
a positive probability.
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only has to make sure that πs and πf are such that the value of γ that solves
the equality condition for case 8 (4.1) is between 0 and 1.
As an illustration, take the example
p(e) = 1− 1
2(
√
e+ 1)
,
and λ = 1/4, πf = 1, πs = 5, and δ = 3/4. For α = 3/4 case 8 equilibrium
effort level is e∗8 ≈ 0.1 and case 1 effort level is e∗1 ≈ 0.3. Changing α to 1/4
results in an outcome more expected by standard intuition, e∗
8
≈ 0.1 > e∗
1
≈
0.05.20
5 Conclusions
We have analyzed the economic reasons of individual software developers
and commercial companies to participate in open source projects. A talented
software developer has an incentive to work on an open source project in
order to make his talent observable for all employers rather than only his
own. This improves his bargaining position after the signal about his talent
has been revealed. By letting employees work on open source projects, firms
can credibly commit to pay high future wages for talented programmers. Our
model yields several results which are expected by intuition. However, for
two results, standard intuition can be misleading. First, it is more likely that
talented programmers choose to do open source development if there is a
large productivity difference between talented and untalented programmers.
Second, working in a highly visible open source job leads to a higher effort
level in a setup where future employers cannot distinguish whether success
is due to effort or talent. Interestingly, a formalization of the model shows
that there are conditions under which these results are reversed. We have
also provided some examples that illustrate that even though open versus
20This example satisfies the abovementioned conditions p′ > 0, p′(0) = ∞, p′(∞) = 0,
and is sufficiently concave p′′(e) < −λp′(e)/[α(1 − λ)δp(0)(pis − pif )] < 0 in the relevant
region. For both values of α, the case 8 fraction of untalented workers doing open source
is γ8 ≈ 0.76 ∈ [0, 1].
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closed source development is the best fitting case, there is a more general
principle at work: the level of visibility of jobs. High and low visibility
jobs are observed in academic (open) versus commercial (closed) research,
consulting versus management, positions with versus without client contact
in general, mutual fund managers whose names are disclosed versus those
whose are not.
Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 No Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
Proposition 3. If the employer has all the bargaining power (α = 0), no
equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
Proof. If the employer has all the bargaining power, he can afford paying
the talented employee the same wage as to someone who switches jobs at
stage 2, w. No pure strategy equilibrium exists for any w as we will show
in the following. If w = wf , a firm can offer w = wf + ε (with ε very
small), attract all workers (both talented and untalented) and make profits,
since it pays a wage lower than expected productivity. The same argument
applies for wf < w < E(π): a firm can offer w + ε < E(π), attract all
workers and make profits. A firm offering w = E(π) would make losses,
because only untalented workers will switch jobs, since talented workers are
indifferent and hence do not switch. Finally, w > E(π) obviously cannot
be an equilibrium, since a firm offering a wage above expected productivity
would make losses.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Cases 2 and 3: ǫ = 0, γ ∈ (0, 1]: In this case a fraction 0 < γ ≤ 1 of the
untalented workers do open source development and all the talented
workers do closed source development. In such a case, doing open
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source development would be a perfect signal for being untalented and
the untalented workers would choose to do closed source development.
Cases 3 and 6: γ = 1, ǫ ∈ [0, 1): In this case all the untalented workers
and a fraction 0 ≤ ǫ < 1 of the talented workers do open source
development. In such a case, doing closed source development would
be a perfect signal for being talented and the talented workers would
choose to do closed source development.
Cases 4 and 7: γ = 0, ǫ ∈ (0, 1]: In this case all the untalented workers
do closed source development and a fraction 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 of the talented
workers do open source development. In such a case, doing open source
development would be a perfect signal for being talented and the un-
talented workers would choose to do open source development as well.
Case 1: both closed source. In case 1, both the talented and the un-
talented workers do closed source development in period 1. We assume that
if the workers deviate from the firms’ beliefs, they will be considered to be
untalented. The payoffs of a talented worker who chooses to do closed source
development is given by
E[V ctc] = w1 + δ[p1(αE(π|S ∩C)+ (1−α)E(π|F ∩C)+ (1− p1)E(π|F ∩C)].
with
w1 = λ{E(π|T )+δ[E(π|S∩C)−αE(π|S∩C)−(1−α)E(π|F∩C)]}+(1−λ)E(π|U).
The expression above reflects that firms do Bayesian updating after they
see whether a worker had success or not. The second period wage of an
unsuccessful worker is E[π|F ∩ C] and the wage of a successful worker is
again determined by the Nash bargaining solution: αE(π|S ∩ C) + (1 −
α)E(π|F ∩ C). The first period wage is determined by a similar logic as in
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section 2: you pay more than the expected first period productivity, since
you expect to exploit talented workers in the second period.
If the talented worker chooses to participate in an open source project
in period 1 (contrary to the firm’s expectation), he earns E[V cto] = δE[π|U ].
The payoffs for the untalented worker are
E[V cuc] = w1+δ[p0(αE(π|S ∩C)+(1−α)E(π|F ∩C))+(1−p0)E(π|F ∩C)].
and
E[V cuo] = δE[π|U ].
Case 1 is an equilibrium if
w1+δ[p0(αE(π|S∩C)+(1−α)E(π|F ∩C))+(1−p0)E(π|F ∩C)] > δE[π|U ].
Substituting for the expected probabilities with γ = ǫ = 0 (since we are
in case 1) and, we get
λ
{
E(π|T ) + δ
[
(1 − α)
(
p1λE(π|T ) + p0(1− λ)E(π|U)
p1λ+ p0(1− λ)
−(1− p1)λE(π|T ) + (1− p0)(1 − λ)E(π|U)
(1− p1)λ+ (1− p0)(1 − λ)
)]}
+ (1− λ)E(π|U)
+ δ
[
p0
(
α
p1λE(π|T ) + p0(1− λ)E(π|U)
p1λ+ p0(1− λ) +(1− α)
(1− p1)λE(π|T ) + (1− p0)(1 − λ)E(π|U)
(1− p1)λ+ (1− p0)(1 − λ)
)
+(1− p0)(1− p1)λE(π|T ) + (1− p0)(1− λ)E(π|U)
(1− p1)λ+ (1− p0)(1− λ)
]
> δE(π|U)
Assuming p0 → 0, the expression simplifies to
λ
{
E(π|T ) + δ
[
(1− α)
(
E(π|T )− (1− p1)λE(π|T ) + (1− λ)πf
(1− p1)λ+ (1− λ)
)]}
+ (1− λ)πf + δ
[
(1− p1)λE(π|T ) + (1− λ)πf
(1− p1)λ+ (1− λ)
]
> δπf
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Case 5: A fraction of both talented and untalented workers do
open source. In case 5, a fraction 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 of the talented workers and
a fraction 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 of the untalented workers do open source development
in period 1. If a talented worker chooses to do closed source development in
period 1, he earns the net present value
E[Vtc] = w1+ δ[p1(αE(π|S ∩C)+(1−α)E(π|F ∩C))+(1−p1)E(π|F ∩C)].
with
w1 = P (T |C){E(π|T )+δ[E(π|S∩C)−αE(π|S∩C)−(1−α)E(π|F∩C)]}+P (U |C)E(π|U).
where
P (T |C) = (1− ǫ)λ
(1− ǫ)λ+ (1− γ)(1− λ) .
If the talented worker chooses to participate in an open source project
in period 1, he will earn a wage equal to
E[Vto] = δ[q1E(π|S ∩O) + (1− q1)E(π|F ∩O)].
The payoffs for the untalented workers are
E[Vuc] = w1+δ[p0(αE(π|S ∩C)+(1−α)E(π|F ∩C))+(1−p0)E(π|F ∩C)].
and
E[Vuo] = δ[q0E(π|S ∩O) + (1− q0)E(π|F ∩O)].
Case 5 is an equilibrium if both types of workers are indifferent between
doing closed source or open source development. Hence the equilibrium
conditions are given by:
E[Vtc] = E[Vto].
and
E[Vuc] = E[Vuo].
One obtains the equilibrium fractions of talented and untalented work-
ers choosing open source development, ǫ and γ, respectively, by solving the
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equilibrium conditions. The question is whether solutions exist such that
ǫ, γ ∈ [0, 1]. That such cases exist can be illustrated by the following nu-
merical example. Take parameter values λ = 3/5, δ = 5/2, α = 3/5,
p1 = q1 = 3/4, p0 = q0 = 0, πs = 5/2, πf = 1/2.
21 This results in the
solution ǫ ≈ 0.82 and γ ≈ 0.36.
Case 9: both open source. In case 9, both types of workers do open
source development in period 1. We choose the firms’ beliefs off the equilib-
rium path as follows: firms believe that a worker who chooses to do closed
source is untalented. Hence, if a talented worker deviates from the equilib-
rium strategy, he earns E[V otc] = (1 + δ)E[π|U ].
If the talented worker chooses to participate in an open source project
in period 1, he will earn a wage equal to the expected productivity over all
workers in the future
E[V oto] = δ[q1E(π|S ∩O) + (1− q1)E(π|F ∩O)].
The payoffs for the untalented workers are
E[V ouc] = (1 + δ)E[π|U ].
and
E[V ouo] = δ[q0E(π|S ∩O) + (1− q0)E(π|F ∩O)].
Case 9 is an equilibrium if
δ[q0E(π|S ∩O) + (1− q0)E(π|F ∩O)] > (1 + δ)E[π|U ].
Writing down this condition explicitly yields
δ
(
q0
{
q1ǫλE[π|T ] + q0γ(1− λ)E[π|U ]
q1ǫλ+ q0γ(1 − λ)
}
+(1− q0)
{
(1− q1)ǫλE[π|T ] + (1− q0)γ(1− λ)E[π|U ]
(1− q1)ǫλ+ (1− q0)γ(1− λ)
})
> (1 + δ)E[π|U ]
21Note that the discount rate can be larger than 1, since employment in the second
stage may be for longer time than employment in the first stage. However, there are also
examples with δ < 1.
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